Athens Digest continues its effort to address key issues concerning the EU and Greece, with a specific focus on the country’s fundamental positions on every matter. In this context, we spoke with the Greek Ambassador Permanent Representative to the EU, Ioannis Vrailas, regarding European Security and Defence.

As the EU aims to assume greater responsibility for its security, the Ambassador emphasizes three crucial actions: “First, we must develop a comprehensive common strategic culture, based on a joint threat analysis. Secondly, we should confront the fact that, as we speak, the EU and its Member States clearly do not make the massive investments that are needed to meet the price tag of military equipment, which is a very expensive affair … And third, once we agree on the wider picture and the money, we must proceed in such a way so as to ensure that all 27 feel that no one will be left behind and they all stand to gain from the common endeavour,” he says.


Ioannis Vrailas, Greek Ambassador Permanent Representative to the EU

 Interview with John Papageorgiou

Let us start with the basics. What are the challenges that Europe is facing when it comes to its security and defence? Why a common European approach is on the table?

The war in Ukraine has shaken the essential pillars of the security and defence architecture on our continent, which we had been taken for granted since the end of the Cold War. The recent tragic events in the Middle East reminded us how fragile our neighbourhood is, and the crises in other parts of the world, such as in the Sahel or in the Horn of Africa, confirmed that they have wider repercussions which will affect us sooner or later. Geopolitical rivalries are rife and the fundamental principles of international law are being questioned by a worryingly rising numbers of revisionist actors around in the world. We are also confronted with the horizontal threats and challenges, linked to climate change, radicalism of all sorts, international terrorism, organized crime, cybersecurity, misinformation, to mention but the obvious ones. And we are increasingly unable to convince the vast majority of the countries, especially in the Global South, of the universality of the values and principles which we hold dear.

Against this backdrop, it has dawned on the EU and its Member States that our collective output on security and defence, especially when it comes to military capabilities, is absolutely not larger than the sum of our individual parts – quite to the contrary, the current totally fragmented landscape is simply not equal to today’s needs and requirements. In addition, even though it remains the foundation stone and bedrock of our security, we can no longer take the transatlantic relationship for granted, at least not in the way we had been comfortably accustomed to. The bottom line is that, if we fail to rise to the challenges, there will likely be serious implications for our countries and our citizens, maybe already in a not-so-distant future.

What was the level of preparedness of the EU for security threats and crises before 2022 and what has changed since then?

The explosive mixture that I have referred to was there already, and it is fair to say that there had been a lot of wake-up calls before 2022 that we either misinterpreted or even failed to take into account. On the other hand, I would not wish to give the impression that the EU had been sitting completely idle. We had already taken some significant decisions, such as commitments related to the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) under article 42 (6) of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Defence Fund (EDF), with a budget of nearly 8 billion Euros for the period 2021-2027, or the European Peace Facility. Then, in March 2022, the European Leaders committed in Versailles to an ambitious programme, aiming to bolster European defence capabilities, increase defence expenditures, step up cooperation through joint projects and common procurement of defence capabilities, boost innovation and strengthen the European defence industry. We also adopted the Strategic Compass, which sets specific goals and timelines in the fields regarding security; the new Regulations of ASAP and EDIRPA (Act in Support of Ammunition Production and European Defence Industry Reinforcement through common Procurement Act), with aim to support EU’s defence industry, to ramp up its manufacturing capacities, to match increased demand for ammunition and missiles and to commonly procure defence products for which there is an urgent and critical need. And last but not least, a little more than a month ago, the Commission published the European Defence Industry Strategy (EDIS) and its financial tool, the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP), with the objective to increase the EU’s defence readiness and to further strengthen the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) for the years to come.

All the above look great on paper. But now they must get off the drawing board and be put into execution if we want to ensure implementation and the achievement of their full potential.

How committed are EU Member States to the ambitious security and defence agenda involving an increase in defence capabilities and expenditures, closer cooperation and a strong European defence industry? How can they best pursue this goal and where the necessary funds may come from?

As I said, given the urgent need for the EU to take more responsibility for its security, the most important objective of all will be implementation. We are witnessing a certain “change of culture” in high level and staff-to-staff contacts, including the realization that the current super-fragmented European landscape in the field of the production of defence capabilities is not suited to the job. But a radically more different mindset is needed. An actor that does not think autonomously will never act as one, regardless of its economic power and capabilities. In recent years, we have managed to prove, when called upon to tackle the pandemic, economic recession or the energy crisis, that we have much more cutting edge when we act together, rather than when each Member State goes its own way. There is every reason to follow the same route on security and defence.

In order to pursue this key objective, we must do two three things. First, we must develop a comprehensive common strategic culture, based on a joint threat analysis. Secondly, we should confront the fact that, as we speak, the EU and its Member States clearly do not make the massive investments that are needed to meet the price tag of military equipment, which is a very expensive affair. It is highly doubtful whether a discussion on increased funding at EU-level should wait until the next Multiannual Financial Framework for the period 2028-2045. At the March 2023 European Council, Leaders concluded that all options are on the table. These could include new funding mechanisms, such as common debt/equity instruments. In order to ease the traditional reluctance of some Member States over common borrowing, the Greek Prime Minister suggested to use the term “defence bonds” instead, so that it is clear that we are talking of a good that is common to all European citizens. And third, once we agree on the wider picture and the money, we must proceed in such a way so as to ensure that all 27 feel that no one will be left behind and they all stand to gain from the common endeavour.

It is fair to say that as serious challenges remain on how to align the positions of 27 EU Member States on all those three fronts, including on defence expenditure. But at the end of the day, the cost of increased security will be miniscule compared to that of insecurity, growing irrelevance and possible future subservience.

What would a more authoritative European defence industry mean for NATO and the EU-US cooperation?

The US has been consistently complaining that the Europeans do not make sufficient efforts to defend themselves. On the other hand, many in Europe fear that such efforts might accelerate American disengagement from Europe. In my view, a stronger EU in security and defence does not mean less cooperation between EU and USA, within or outside the NATO framework. If we want to protect our 450 million citizens and our own interests, we need to be able to act on our own, if needed. And considering that most EU Member States are also NATO allies, a stronger EU in the production of military capabilities will contribute to a stronger Alliance as well. In my view, strategic autonomy is not a binary choice (between either having full autonomy or not), but rather widens the spectrum of options and contingency planning at our disposal.

Turning to Greece, where does Athens stand in the current security debate and what could it contribute to a closer cooperation in this sector?

Since the inception of the Common Security and Defence Policy, we have been strong advocates of a stronger EU in this field. security and defence. We can bring to bear our unique geographical location, as a frontline State at the Union’s external borders. We spend a sizeable part of our budget to further strengthen our already powerful Armed Forces. Our geographical position at the external borders of the Union makes us a frontline State for tackling different challenges, as was the case with the instrumentalisation of migratory flows in 2020. We have repeatedly and significantly contributed to EU Missions – not least the Operations Atalanta, Irini and, as of  February 2024, EUNAVFOR ASPIDES in support of maritime security in the Red Sea.

Moreover, our defence industry is quickly developing, including in the private sector. We recently hosted an event in Brussels, during which many Greek companies amply confirmed that even SMSs from smaller and medium-sized Member States can contribute to the cause. In the same spirit, the Government is moving in the direction of creating a defence ecosystem, through the soon-to-be-created Hellenic Centre for Defense Innovation which would look at the various needs, prioritize them and then finance the construction of prototypes. This would allow Greece to follow some international examples of countries of a similar size that have been very successful in this particular field.

In short, only good things will happen if we pull our collective resources together in a coordinated and inclusive way, and Greece is ready to play its part.

Concluding, are you optimistic that the EU can meet such an ambitious goal? European countries failed to do so even before the establishment of the Union.

As always, crises offer opportunities for change because they make us realize what is truly important and what needs to be done. I am an optimist by nature, but this is irrelevant because politicians and diplomats will be judged on grounds of pragmatism. It has been said that a string case is the case of the strong. Because given the challenges and the difficulty of the task at hand, we must learn to speak the language of power and remember that defence will become soon (if it is not already) a pillar of European sovereignty. If we fall flat, we will find that we will have become a second-tier international actor, we will have failed the values that we represent and we will have undermined the future and the well-being of the peoples of the EU.